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Abstract 
 
The paper studies daily interbank rate determination and volatility in the Dominican 
Republic during a major banking crisis. The investigation uses a novel, automatic, 
general-to-specific technology (PcGets) to reduce a baseline (mean) specification 
linking interbank rates and aggregate banking system excess reserves. This specification 
is subsequently embedded in a GARCH model. Recursive coefficient analysis reveals 
that in times of financial stability positive or negative shocks have similar effects. In 
contrast, during banking crisis negative impacts (e.g. a decrease in excess reserves) 
generate larger volatility of interbank rates than positive ones.  
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DAILY INTERBANK RATE DETERMINATION AND VOLATILITY 
IN A BANKING CRISIS 
 
Interbank interest rate determination and volatility are of key importance in the day-to-
day monitoring of monetary policy. In fact, many economies target the short-end of the 
yield curve as a policy strategy (e.g., Australia, Canada, and New Zealand), therefore 
enhancing the role of interbank rates (See Prati, Bartolini, and Bertola, 2003). In less 
developed systems -were monetary institutions are generally weak- a key step in 
developing an effective monetary policy strategy is the construction of a mechanism to 
affect short-term interest rates. Henceforth understanding interbank interest rate 
determination becomes of paramount importance. 
 In this context, the Dominican Republic –a country in which the banking system 
operates under a fractional reserves system- is of interest as a case study, particularly in 
the light of the severe banking crisis that affected the economy during 2002-2003. 
Remarkably, the total bailout package for the troubled banks amounted to almost 20% 
of GDP in 2003, with one bank (BANINTER) accounting for 15% of the total –likely to 
be amongst the most significant costs generated by a single financial institution. (See 
The New York Times editorial article “Dominican Republic in crisis”, December 29th, 
2003.) Clearly, it is important to better understand the impact that these events have on 
the interbank market, and particularly on its volatility1.   
 The paper’s contribution is to explore the link between interbank rates and 
excess reserves using a novel econometric technology, namely PcGets, the automatic 
model selection approach put forward by Hendry and Krolzig (2001, 2003), alongside 
more conventional volatility techniques (e.g. Bollerslev, 1986). To achieve this end the 
                                                 
1 And (implicitly) on the rest of the term structure and the potential effectiveness of 
monetary policy 
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investigation employs daily data on aggregate excess reserves (in millions of Dominican 
Pesos- DoP), and interbank rates (in percentage points) for the period ranging from 
January 1999 to November 2003 –a total of 1,210 observations for each variable. The 
data source is the Central Bank of the Dominican Republic.  
As a preliminary evaluation, Figure 1 displays excess reserves and the interbank 
rate. The graph clearly shows the expected negative relationship between these variables 
under a fractional reserves banking system. In order to investigate this relationship 
formally, the paper follows a two stage strategy.  
Firstly, it models interbank interest rates as a function of excess reserves using a 
dynamic time series model since, as noted before, the DR operates a fractional reserves 
system. This model is computed using a general-to-specific (GETS) automatic 
technique -PcGets. The method in question makes operational the ideas developed by 
Hoover and Perez (1999) -which advanced an algorithm to reproduce the GETS 
methodology- alongside Hendry’s approach to empirical econometric modeling (e.g. 
Hendry, 1995). The automated GETS approach starts the specification search from a 
general unrestricted model (GUM) that is assumed to represent the data generating 
process (DGP). On the reliability of the approach, Monte Carlo experiments by Hendry 
and Krolzig (2001) show that estimates obtained with the computer programme PcGets 
are close to those recovered from the actual DGP.  
Secondly, and in the light of the high frequency data at hand, the inquiry 
proceeds to use the automatically selected model as the baseline specification for the 
mean equation in an asymmetric generalized autoregressive conditional heterocedasticy 
(GARCH) framework (Bollerslev, 1986; Hentschel, 1995).  
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The baseline specification for the first step is given by 
 
RESr φδ += .         (1)  
 
In (1) r  is the interbank rate, while RES are the aggregate excess reserves of the 
banking system.δ is a constant term, whileφ is a parameter to be determined 
empirically. The specification search process starts from a GUM that can be written as  
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(2) is an autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) model of order 20 (See Hendry, Pagan, 
and Sargan, 1984), intended to capture the information contained in the previous month.  
Given that r and RES are integrated of order zero, equation (2) is modeled as a stationary 
system2. The final, automatically selected model, is 
 
.00009.004.009.008.015.019.039.063.0 300001.01401.0901.0502.0302.0202.0102.011.0 −−−−−−− −++++++= tttttttt RESrrrrrrr  
(3) 
 
Equation (3) has coefficients that are of a sensible magnitude (standard errors inside 
parentheses), with the ones affecting r displaying a decaying lag profile, as expected, 
and the one corresponding to RES being negative; all coefficients are significant at the 
1% level. Note that the long run solution for the coefficient affecting RES is -0.0029. 
                                                 
2 The augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic for RES is -4.271, significant at the 1% 
level. The Dickey-Fuller test statistic for r is -4.351, also significant at the 1% level. 
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 Now that a reasonable specification has been obtained to explain r , the study 
proceeds to estimate a GARCH model using this preferred solution. Specifically, the 
research strategy is to model the mean equation (3) alongside a general GARCH 
volatility equation (Bollerslev, 1986). Thus the econometric model can be written as 
 
,314149955332211 tttttttttt uhRESrrrrrrr +++++++++= −−−−−−− ωφλλλλλλα  (4a) 
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Note that this specification is quite flexible, by allowing for asymmetric (ϑ ) and 
threshold (ψ ), and in-mean-effects ( )ω in the variance (4b) and mean (4a) equations, 
respectively, i.e. an ATGARCH-M (1, 1). In this framework 11 =−tD  if ϑp1−tu , and 
zero otherwise. Notably, this specification encompasses several members of the 
GARCH family (See Hentschel, 1995). The model is estimated using the maximum 
likelihood technique, and robust standard errors are computed (displayed inside 
parentheses). The exercise yields the following results 
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Note that in this final model 14r and ψ  (intended to capture the threshold effect) 
are not present, since they were not statistically significant. The reader should also note 
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that several calendar and institutional effects were tested (in the mean and variance 
equations) but did not add to the model’s fit, at least above the rest of the indicators 
retained, and therefore do not appear in the final results. Most of the coefficients 
reported in (5a) and (5b) are significant at the 1% level -and at least at the 5%. 
Additionally, autocorrelation (Port.m) and ARCH tests are passed by the final model, 
and are reported at the bottom of equations (5a) and (5b)3.  
 A crucial coefficient reported in (5a) and (5b) isϑ , the one capturing 
asymmetric effects. It shows that, on average, positive shocks on interbank interest rate 
volatility have a smaller impact than negative ones. Additionally, the in-mean-effect 
ω is significant. Note, however, that the traditional risk-return trade-off interpretation of 
ω does not apply in this case. In fact the coefficient is negative, implying that a positive 
shock to volatility (e.g. an increase in excess reserves) reduces the interbank interest 
rate.   
In order to further evaluate these findings, the recursively estimated GARCH 
coefficients’ t-ratios are exhibited in Figure 2. A salient feature of these graphs is the 
increased significance of all the volatility indicators roughly from August 2002 (marked 
with ellipses). Remarkably, at this point in time the monetary authorities began to 
provide liquidity assistance to the main troubled bank –BANINTER (See Figure 1). It is 
worth noting that the GARCH asymmetric coefficient’s t-ratio actually becomes 
increasingly significant only after the unset of the crisis. So apparently in times of 
financial stability positive or negative shocks have similar effects. In contrast, during 
banking crisis negative impacts generate larger volatility of interbank rates. 
These finding have important implications for monetary policy design and 
implementation. If monetary authorities use interbank rates to send signals to the rest of 
                                                 
3 See Hendry and Krolzig (2003) for further details on these tests. 
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the term structure of interest rates, it is of great importance to monitor excess reserves 
and interbank rates so that any surge in volatility arising from shocks to these variables -
such as reserves deficiencies generated by troubled banks- can be curtail, and 
henceforth safeguard monetary policy effectiveness. The study shows that asymmetric 
volatility indicators could prove valuable as early warning indicators in the day-to-day 
monitoring of the interbank market.  
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Figure 1 
Daily interbank rate (%) and aggregate excess reserves, 1999.01-2003.11 
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Figure 2 
AGARCH-M recursive t-ratios 
 
 
600 700 800 900 1000 1100
1
2
3
4 t: alpha_0 
600 700 800 900 1000 1100
2.75
3.00
3.25
3.50 t: alpha_1 
600 700 800 900 1000 1100
5
6
t: beta_1 
600 700 800 900 1000 1100
1.0
1.5
2.0
t: asymmetry 
600 700 800 900 1000 1100
-3
-2
-1 t: h_t 
 
